Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment by Jeanette Brosig & Timo Heinrich
RUHR
ECONOMIC PAPERS






Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 2283 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #254 
Responsible Editor: Volker Clausen
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2011
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-296-5
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #254
Jeannette Brosig and Timo Heinrich
Reputation and Mechanism Choice
in Procurement Auctions
An ExperimentBibliograﬁ  sche Informationen 
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen National-
bibliograﬁ  e; detaillierte bibliograﬁ  sche Daten sind im Internet über: 
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufb  ar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-296-5Jeannette Brosig and Timo Heinrich1
Reputation and Mechanism Choice in 
Procurement Auctions – An Experiment
Abstract
We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common 
mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to 
buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders 
in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation 
of bidders. We ﬁ  nd that bidders supply higher quality in buyer-determined auctions 
leading to higher market eﬃ   ciencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the 
buyer-determined auction over the price-based auction, while only half of the bidders 
do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers’ and bidders’ behavior and proﬁ  ts provides 
insights into their mechanism choice.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: D44, C91, C72
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auction choice; experimental economics
April 2011
1  Both University of Duisburg-Essen. – We thank seminar and conference participants in Austin, 
Bonn, Cologne, Copenhagen, Essen, and Melbourne for helpful comments. Financial support by 
the Innovation Fund of the University of Magdeburg, Germany, is gratefully acknowledged. – All 
correspondence to Timo Heinrich, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany, E-Mail: timo.heinrich@ibes.uni-due.de.4 
1 Introduction 
Every year companies and government agencies buy billions worth of goods and services using 
procurement auctions. By now, several internet marketplaces for procurement auctions exist and 
most major vendors integrate support of procurement auctions in their enterprise resource plan-
ning systems. Recently, several web pages have emerged that also offer procurement auctions to 
consumers allowing them to shop for transportation services or construction work. 
As in many market interactions, trades initiated through procurement auctions are prone to moral 
hazard because the quality of the goods or the exerted effort is not contractible. Problems of mor-
al hazard could be overcome by reputation. Accordingly, buyers or platforms often request refer-
ences or collect information on past performances. The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation 
states that “[w]hen selecting contractors to provide products or perform services, the Government 
will use contractors who have a track record of successful past performance or who demonstrate 
a current superior ability to perform.” (Federal Acquisition Regulation 2005, Paragraph 1.102-2). 
Similarly, the current public procurement directive of the European Union (EU Directive 
2004/18/EC) allows public buyers to request “a list of the works carried out over the past five 
years, accompanied by certificates of satisfactory execution for the most important works” (Ar-
ticle 48, Paragraph 2). 
The increasing prevalence of electronic auctions increases the scope of procurement mechanisms 
and eventually asks the initiators of auctions to become market-designers. They have to set start-
ing and reserve prices and have to define award criteria. The directive of the European Union, 
explicitly offers the choice between two award criteria: “the lowest price only” or “the most eco-
nomically advantageous”, the latter allowing for a number of criteria such as “quality, price, 
technical merit” and so on (EU Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 53, Paragraph 1). In research on 
procurement auctions these two options are usually referred to as ‘price-based procurement auc-
tions’ and ‘buyer-determined procurement auctions’ (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Haruvy, & Katok, 
2007). While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can 
choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions based on price and all other available crite-
ria (often subsumed as quality).  
In this study, we focus on the performance of these two auction mechanisms in a setting with 
moral hazard where contingent contracts are not feasible. Situations where contracts cannot be 5 
based on the outcome of the transaction are common, e.g., in online procurement where legal en-
forcement would be too costly or in the procurement of services, where quality cannot be verified 
by a court. Our buyer-determined auctions allow buyers to choose according to two criteria: price 
and information about the bidder’s past behavior. This gives bidders an opportunity to build up 
reputation. By comparing price-based and buyer-determined auctions, we can analyze the effect 
of reputation in procurement auctions. In addition, we study buyers’ and sellers’ preferences re-
garding price-based and buyer-determined auctions (i.e., their mechanism choice) and shed some 
light on the acceptance and use of reputation mechanisms.  
The next section briefly overviews literature related to reputation building and the two auction 
mechanisms employed in our study. In section 3 we describe the auction games and the experi-
mental procedure and in section 4 we present our observations. Section 5 summarizes the results 
and concludes. 
2  Related Literature 
Overviews of current issues in procurement auctions can be found in Beall et al. (2003), Bichler 
& Steinberg (2007), Elmaghraby (2007), Rothkopf & Whinston (2007), and Gupta, Koulamas, & 
Kyparisis (2009). In particular, Rothkopf & Whinston (2007) identify the role of reputation in 
procurement as an important issue for future research. According to Wilson (1985) reputation in a 
game-theoretic sense is the history of a player's actions as they are observed by others. In the fi-
nitely repeated versions of the chain-store game and the prisoners' dilemma players can increase 
their payoff by creating a reputation for ‘fighting entry’ or ‘cooperating’ as long as there is uncer-
tainty about the type of players (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982, Kreps & Wilson, 
1982, Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). That is, as long as ‘irrational’ players of a certain type might 
exist, players can increase their payoffs by creating a reputation for being of that type. A similar 
reasoning applies to the markets of experience goods. Companies can create a reputation for sup-
plying goods of high quality and charge higher prices to recoup investments for quality as de-
scribed by Klein & Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), among others. In that way reputation 
might help to overcome problems caused by moral hazard.
2  
                                                 
2 Contracting under moral hazard has been widely studied (see, e.g., the textbooks by Laffont & Tirole (1993), Sala-
nié, 1997, and Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005), though only a few authors have analyzed moral hazard in procurement 6 
When introducing reputation information about bidders in procurement auctions, as it is the case 
in our study, these auctions become multi-dimensional. Buyers can not only consider prices, but 
also bidders' reputation. The theoretical work on multi-dimensional auctions has been pioneered 
by Che (1993). So far three experimental studies compared the behavior in price-based and buy-
er-determined procurement auctions in this setting. These studies assume that bidders differ by 
their costs and the exogenously determined quality and that buyers can evaluate bids according to 
the offered price and quality. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) study sealed-bid auctions and 
show theoretically that the price-based auction only yields a higher surplus to the buyer when the 
correlation between costs and quality is low or when there are few bidders. They confirm their 
theoretical findings in an experiment. Shachat & Swarthout (2010) calculate the equilibrium pre-
dictions for the sealed-bid buyer-determined auction and for a dynamic price-based auction with 
bidding credits. They show theoretically that the buyer surplus is higher in the latter auction for-
mat while the former is socially efficient. Actual behavior deviates from this prediction: In their 
experiment buyers and sellers receive a higher surplus in the sealed-bid buyer-determined auction 
due to non-equilibrium bidding and non-optimal bidding credits. Katok & Wambach (2008) 
compare sealed-bid price-based auctions to dynamic buyer-determined auctions, assuming that 
bidders are uncertain about the quality of their offer. They show theoretically and empirically that 
under this assumption the former are less prone to collusion.  
The quality (or the effort) is often not exogenously determined, but at the discretion of the bidder, 
however. Cox, Isacc, Cech, & Conn (1996) and Onderstal & Van de Meerendonk (2009) study 
experimentally how different auction mechanisms perform when incentive contracts are auc-
tioned off. Different from them, we study a moral hazard setting, often encountered in practice, 
where quality is not contractible. We only allow for fixed-price contracts and focus on the role of 
reputation as an incentive to provide above minimum quality.
3 
                                                                                                                                                              
auctions with non-contractible quality. To our knowledge the only theoretical models in this field have been devel-
oped by Kim (1998), Doni (2006), Cesi & Albano (2008), and Calzolari & Spagnolo (2009). In these models con-
tractors can be disciplined to exert more than minimal effort by threatening to exclude them from future auctions. If 
the loss of future trade is larger than the gain from shirking, contractors will refrain from opportunistic behavior. 
3 Conceptually our paper is also related to the literature to experimental studies on labor markets (see, e.g., Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1993, Brown, Falk, & Fehr, 2004, and Fehr, Klein, & Schmidt, 2007), trust and reputation 
(see, e.g., Keser, 2003, Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004, and Bohnet & Huck, 2004) and trust and competition 
(see, e.g., Bolton, Loebbecke, & Ockenfels, 2008, Dulleck, Kerschbamer, & Sutter, 2011, and Huck, Lünser, & Ty-
ran, 2010). Even though these strands of literature extensively study the effects of reputation and competition in situ-
ations with moral hazard, they do not focus on bidding behavior or mechanism choices. 7 
3  Experimental Design 
We experimentally study the behavior in procurement auctions assuming that buyers can consider 
the reputation of bidders in buyer-determined auctions only. We employ sealed-bid first-price 
auctions with independent private values and two bidders. Our experiment consists of two parts. 
In the first part subjects participate as bidders in a series of first-price procurement auctions bid-
ding against a computerized bidder. The first part is intended to familiarize subjects with the auc-
tion environment and serves as a benchmark for the behavior in the second part of the experi-
ment. During the second part subjects take part in price-based and buyer-determined procurement 
auctions with human opponents. 
3.1  The auction games 
The first-price sealed-bid procurement auction (FPA) used in the first part of the experiment is 
analogous to the standard first-price sealed-bid auction with symmetric independent private val-
ues without reserve price (for surveys see Krishna, 2002; McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Menezes 
& Monteiro, 2004; Wolfstetter, 1995; on competitive bidding with private costs see Cohen & 
Loeb, 1990; Holt, 1980). The two bidders i = 1, 2 compete for a project by bidding a price for 
which they are willing to execute the project. Before the auction, both bidders learn about their 
costs for completing the project. Bidders know that their costs ci are independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution with support [100, 400] and that they cannot bid above 400. We interpret 
this maximum bid as the buyer’s valuation of the project v. The bidder offering the lowest price 
wins the project. In this auction the symmetric risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium (RNNE) bidding 
function depending on the cost realization ci is given by 
 
FPA(ci) = 200+ci/2. 
The winning bidder (the seller) earns a profit of  S =  
FPA-ci from completing the project. The los-
ing bidder makes a profit of zero. 
Based on the FPA design, the second part involves a series of procurement auctions that model 
the situation of moral hazard as it is prevalent in many real life procurement situations: After 
winning the project the seller can reduce his cost on the expense of the buyer, for example by 
providing lower effort or by choosing a lower quality. We account for this by introducing a quali-
ty factor qi that is chosen by the seller from the interval [0.5, 1]. It is multiplied with the cost ci 8 
drawn for the seller and with the buyer’s valuation v. As in the FPA, the two bidders know that 
their costs ci are independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [100, 400] and 
that they cannot bid above 400. The winning bidder choosing a bid bi earns a profit of  S = bi-qici 
while the losing bidder earns zero profits. The buyer earns a profit of  B = qiv-bi. 
We use two variants of procurements auctions with moral hazard: price-based and buyer-
determined procurement auctions. Our price-based procurement auctions are strategically equiv-
alent to first-price procurement auctions. The bidder offering the lowest price wins the project. In 
these auctions there is no incentive to choose a qi larger than 0.5. It follows that the RNNE bid-
ding function is given by 
 
PB(ci) = 100+ci/4. 
Buyer and seller earn a profit of  B =  S = 100-ci/4.  
The buyer-determined procurement auctions used in our experiment allow the buyer to determine 
the winning bidder. The buyer is informed about the prices offered by the two competing bidders 
as well as about their previous choices of qi (specifically, the average quality  i q  of all previous 
auctions and the quality choice made in the last auction qi
t-1). In a finite game with complete in-
formation and common knowledge of rationality and selfishness, none of the bidders will choose 
a qi above 0.5 in the last auction. By backward induction this quality level will be chosen in all 
previous auctions and bidders will bid according to  
PB. If we relax the assumption of rationality 
and selfishness, several reputation equilibria may emerge, in which subjects choose above mini-
mum quality. 
3.2 Experimental  procedure 
In the first part subjects participated in six first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions bidding 
against a computerized opponent programmed to bid according to the RNNE strategy. They did 
not receive any feedback on the opponent’s behavior either in the course of or after completion of 
the first part. Subjects were informed accordingly (all instructions are included in the Appendix). 
The second part consisted of 18 procurement auctions with moral hazard. Before the start of the 
second part new instructions were handed out to subjects and a computerized test of understand-
ing followed. Subjects were then randomly assigned either the role of buyer or bidder and kept 
this role for all 18 auctions. In each auction one buyer faced two bidders. The three subjects were 9 
randomly re-matched after each auction with the publicly announced restriction that subjects 
would not meet the same participants in two consecutive auctions. In each treatment, a total of 72 
subjects were re-matched within eight matching groups (each consisting of nine subjects) gene-
rating eight independent observations per treatment. After completion of the second part subjects 
were informed about their payoff for the first part and about the outcome of each auction in the 
second part.  
We independently drew series of costs for the six auctions in the first part and for the 18 auctions 
in the second part. For the first part we drew two series of costs, one for the human bidder and 
one for the computerized opponent. By this, all subjects faced the same behavior and the same 
costs in the first part. For the second part, we drew six series of costs, one for each bidder within 
a matching group. To make the data comparable across treatments the same series of costs were 
used in all sessions and treatments.  
The four treatments differed regarding the second part of the experiment only (see Table 1). The 
first treatment consisted of 18 price-based procurement auctions (PB), the second consisted of 18 
buyer-determined procurement auctions (BD), and the third asked buyers and bidders to choose 
between the two auction mechanisms (Choice). In the Choice treatment all subjects had to state 
their preference for one of the mechanisms before each of the 18 auctions (and, in case of bid-
ders, before learning their costs). The choice between mechanisms was incentivized. By stating 
their preference, each participant could increase the probability of her preferred mechanism being 
payoff-relevant in the respective auction by 20 percentage points. After making their choice, sub-
jects had to state their decisions for both mechanisms not knowing which of the two has been se-
lected in that particular auction. Decisions made in the price-based auction in Choice did not have 
a bearing on those made in the buyer-determined auction in this treatment, and vice versa.  
Table 1 – Treatments 
Treatment  Part 1  Part 2  N 
PB  FPA Price-based  auctions  72 
BD  FPA Buyer-determined  auctions  72 
Choice  FPA  Price-based auctions and        
buyer-determined auctions 
72 10 
After completion of the experiment subjects received the aggregated payoff for all auctions plus a show-
up fee. The average payoff was 14 Euro and the sessions lasted about 90 minutes. All sessions were 
run at the Magdeburg Laboratory for Experimental Economics (MaXLab), Germany, using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). No subject participated in more than one session.  
4   Results 
4.1 First  Part 
The results of the first part are in line with previous experimental results on procurement auctions 
and reveal overly aggressive bidding behavior (Brosig & Reiß, 2007). Of the 1296 bids 75 per-
cent were below the RNNE prediction. Applying two-tailed Binomial tests, we observe signifi-
cant underbidding in each of the six auctions (p = 0.000). The underbidding in the procurement 
context is equivalent to overbidding in standard auctions, which is commonly observed in expe-
riments (Kagel & Levin, 2008).  
4.2 Second  Part 
Mechanism Choice 
The Choice treatment allows analyzing subjects' choice between the two procurement mechan-
isms and provides insight into their preference for reputation information. Figure 1 presents the 
share of buyers and bidders choosing the buyer-determined mechanism for each of the 18 auc-
tions. Almost all buyers and somewhat less than half of the bidders prefer the buyer-determined 
auction. Specifically, for buyers the average frequency of those choosing this auction is signifi-
cantly higher than 50 percent (p = 0.012, two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon test). In contrast, bid-
ders show a tendency to prefer the price-based auction, i.e., they choose it in 62 percent of all 
cases which is weakly significantly larger than 50 percent (p = 0.093, two-tailed one sample Wil-
coxon test).
4 These results imply that, in anonymous markets, there is a preference for reputation 
information (i.e., an institution that provides information about past behavior) – and this is true 
not only for buyers, but also for a considerable number of bidders. But does reputation informa-
                                                 
4 The share of buyers preferring the buyer-determined auction is significantly different (at the five percent level) 
from all shares up to 89 percent. The share of bidders preferring the price-based auction is significantly different (at 
the five percent level) from all shares below or equal to 49 percent. 11 
tion work, i.e., does it reduce moral hazard and increase market efficiency? Moreover, is buyers' 
and sellers' preference for a certain auction mechanism reflected in their profits?  
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If information about past behavior reduces moral hazard, we should observe that bidders choose a 
higher quality in buyer-determined auctions than in price-based auctions. As illustrated in Figure 
2, this is the case. Comparing matching group averages, we find significant differences for the 
between-treatment comparison between PB and BD (p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test) 
as well as for the within-treatment comparison in Choice (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). 
There are neither significant differences between PB and PB-Choice nor between BD and BD-
Choice (p   0.172, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). Yet, the average quality is still significant-
ly above 50 percent in PB and PB-Choice and significantly below 100 percent in BD and BD-
Choice (two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.012). The significant increase in quality in 
buyer-determined auctions is sustained from the first to the seventeenth auction (p   0.017, two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U and Wilcoxon tests). From the seventeenth to the eighteenth auction, av-
erage quality drops sharply yielding a significant endgame effect (p   0.036, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
tests). Though, in the last round, average quality is still (weakly) significantly higher in buyer-
determined than in price-based auctions (p = 0.058, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.017, 
two-tailed Wilcoxon test). 12 


































Driven by the higher quality chosen by bidders, market efficiency is significantly higher in the 
buyer-determined auctions than in the price-based auctions (see Figure 3). This holds for the 
comparison between PB and BD (p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test) as well as for the 
comparison between PB-Choice and BD-Choice (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). We define 
market efficiency as the realized sum of profits divided by the highest possible sum of profits in 
an auction. The latter is attained if the seller chooses a quality qi = 1 and has lower costs ci than 
his opponent. Accordingly, behavior in line with the standard theoretical prediction would yield a 
market efficiency of 50 percent. The average efficiency realized in PB and PB-Choice is not sig-
nificantly different from this prediction (two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon test, p   0.124). That is, 
from a welfare perspective, our price based auction mechanism is clearly dominated by our buy-
er-determined mechanism.  13 





































Investigating the gains from trade for buyers and bidders separately, we find that buyer profits are 
higher in buyer-determined auctions than in price-based auctions (see Figure 4). This holds for 
the between-treatment comparison between PB and BD (p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U 
test) and for the within-treatment comparison in Choice (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon test).
5 
For bidders, average profits differ much less between price-based auctions and buyer-determined 
auctions. Though, in Choice the difference is significant (p = 0.036, two-tailed Wilcoxon test), 
yielding higher bidder profits in the price-based auctions. Again, there are neither significant dif-
ferences between PB and PB-Choice nor between BD and BD-Choice (p   0.172, two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney-U tests). That is, the average profits realized by buyers and bidders are fully in 
line with their average mechanism choice behavior. Buyers mainly choose the buyer-determined 
auction where they can base their decisions on previous quality choices as well as on prices and 
subsequently earn larger profits. Bidders earn slightly higher profits in the price-based auctions 
and, accordingly, show a tendency to prefer this mechanism. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that the analysis of the Choice treatment is based on hypothetical profits assuming that the respective mechan-
ism would be payoff-relevant in all auctions. 14 









































PB BD PB-Choice BD-Choice
 
According to the RNNE prediction, buyer and seller within an auction earn the same amount 
while the losing bidder earns zero. On aggregate, this yields a predicted profit of 8.82 Euro for 
buyers and 4.41 Euro for bidders in our experiment as indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 4. 
Comparing realized with predicted profits reveals that, in buyer-determined auctions, both buyers 
and bidders significantly profit from increased market efficiency (p = 0.012, two-tailed one sam-
ple Wilcoxon tests). However, in PB and PB-Choice, where market efficiency is similar to the 
RNNE prediction, we observe that the total profit is split differently than predicted. While bid-
ders earn significantly more than predicted (p = 0.012), buyers earn significantly less (p   
0.036).
6 Remember that the overly aggressive bidding typically observed in FPA would give the 
opposite result. The next section sheds more light on this phenomenon by investigating submitted 
bids in more detail.  
Bidding Behavior 
While the quality choices determine overall attainable profits, the bids determine their feasible 
splits. To study bidding behavior we employ three benchmarks: 
i. Standard Theory (ST): The first benchmark follows the standard theoretical prediction of 
choosing qi = 0.5 in every auction and bidding according to the RNNE prediction over the 
resulting range of costs [50, 200].  
                                                 
6 Note that there are only small variations of the profit over time. When comparing average profits realized in the 
first half of the 18 auctions to those realized in the second half there are no significant differences after excluding the 
first and the last auction (p   0.124, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). 15 
ii. Perfect Reputation (PR): The second benchmark assumes a perfect reputation mechanism 
that induces every bidder to choose qi = 1 and to bid according to the RNNE prediction 
over the range of costs [100, 400].  
iii. Naive Expectations (NE): The third benchmark is based on the assumption that every bid-
der expects the others to choose the same quality qi as himself and bids as if this quality 
choice was common knowledge. Accordingly, bidders bid according to the RNNE predic-
tion over the range of costs [100qi, 400qi]. 
Figure 5 displays the average bids over the costs ci in both mechanisms relative to the three 
benchmarks. The higher quality supplied in the buyer-determined auctions leads to higher costs 
in this mechanism. Accordingly, bidders submit higher bids in the buyer-determined than in the 
priced-based auctions. When comparing matching-group averages this holds for the comparison 
between PB and BD (p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test) as well as for the comparison 
in the Choice treatment (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). Again, there are neither significant 
differences between PB and PB-Choice nor between BD and BD-Choice (p   0.142, two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney-U tests). Interestingly, not only in buyer-determined auctions, but also in price-
based auctions, average bids are still significantly higher than the ST benchmark (and are signifi-
cantly lower than the PR benchmark; p = 0.012, two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon tests). In partic-
ular, we observe that 94 percent of all 1728 bids in PB and PB-Choice are above the standard 
theoretic RNNE prediction. This is in contrast to the first part, where we observe significant un-
derbidding of the RNNE prediction in FPA.  
One of the differences between price-based auctions and FPA is that, in the former, bidders have 
to choose not only their bid, but also their quality. Possibly, bidders who choose quality levels 
larger than 0.5 are subject to some kind of false consensus and expect others to behave in the 
same way as themselves. Comparing average bids submitted in price-based auctions with the NE 
benchmark reveals that bidders overbid this benchmark, i.e., behave as if they expect even higher 
quality levels from others than they choose in these auctions themselves (p = 0.012, two-tailed 
one sample Wilcoxon test). This effect is also prevalent in buyer-determined auctions (BD: p = 16 
0.017, BD-Choice: p = 0.069), though the difference between average bids and the NE bench-
mark is significantly larger in the price-based auctions (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon test).
7 
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If bidders systematically overestimate the opponents’ quality choice, giving feedback should re-
duce this expectation bias over time. In fact, running a control Choice treatment in which bidders 
receive feedback about their opponent’s bid, we observe that, particularly in the second half of 
price-based auctions, the average difference between bids and the NE benchmark is significantly 
lower than in Choice (p = 0.021, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test). This is not true for buyer-
determined auctions, however (p = 0.916). Moreover, even in the second half of the control 
treatment bidders significantly overbid the NE benchmark in price-based auctions (p = 0.012, 
two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon test).
8 Another possible explanation for overbidding might be 
                                                 
7 Note that, in buyer-determined auctions, the average quality factor chosen by bidders is already close to 1, so there 
is not much room for overestimating the other’s quality choice. 
8 Accordingly, all qualitative results reported in this study are also valid in the control treatment. 17 
that the opportunity to individually select a quality factor higher than 0.5 works as an implicit 
coordination device. In that way higher bids might be the result of tacit collusion (as defined by 
Carlton & Perloff, 1999, p.188; for experimental results see Kagel & Levin, 2008), which seems 
to pay off for bidders: in price-based auctions, sellers receive a higher share of the total profit 
than predicted and than that received by buyers. The latter is not true in buyer-determined auc-
tions, in which buyers influence the market outcome by choosing a seller. The next section focus-
es on this buyer behavior and provides more insight into the functioning and the value of reputa-
tion information. 
Buyer Choices 
In our buyer-determined auctions buyers can base their choice on information about past behavior 
and the prices offered. But how do subjects make use of this information? How much weight do 
they put on reputation? 
When selecting a bidder, buyers seem to use both, the bidder’s reputation information and the 
price, in order to calculate expected profits. In particular, we observe that each buyer selects the 
bidder with the highest expected profit based on information about the bidder’s last quality 
choice in at least 12 auctions and based on information about the bidder’s average of last quality 
choices in at least 11 auctions (note that in some auctions both rules would imply to select the 
same bidder). Moreover, average profits realized by buyers do not significantly differ from prof-
its that would result from following one of these two kinds of information in all 18 auctions (p   
0.124, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests), but are significantly higher than profits that would result from 
following rules of thumb like “always choose the bidder with the highest price”, “always choose 
the bidder with the highest last quality choice” and “always choose the bidder with the highest 
average of last quality choices” (p = 0.012, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). These results imply that 
buyers use reputation information and that they do it in a reasonable way. 
The discrete-choice setting of our experiment also allows estimating the buyers’ willingness-to-
pay for both measures of reputation (i.e., their willingness to accept a higher bid bi in turn for 
higher values of  i q  or qi
t-1) using a conditional logit model (Hole, 2007). On aggregate, i.e., pool-
ing over all choices made in auctions two to seventeen, buyers are willing to pay 2.91 Euro-cent 
more if a bidder has supplied an additional percent of average quality in previous auctions (95% 
confidence interval [1.95; 3.86], p = 0.000, 100 bootstrap replications). Remember that an addi-18 
tional percent of actually supplied quality qi increases buyer profits by 4 Euro-cent. The influence 
of the last auction’s quality choice on buyer choices is not significant (95% confidence interval [-
0.08; 1.34], p = 0.080, 100 bootstrap replications). Although the two kinds of reputation informa-
tion – quality in the last auction and average quality in previous auctions – are strongly correlated 
with each other (Spearman's rho = 0.685, p = 0.000), it seems that buyers value the reputation 
information the most which considers behavior in more than the last auction. 
5  Conclusion 
When initiating a procurement auction, buyers usually have to decide on how to evaluate incom-
ing bids. If the characteristics of supplied goods or services can vary across bidders, picking the 
bidder who offers the lowest price will not necessarily maximize the buyer’s profit from the trade 
(or minimize his total costs). In these cases it is common to put other bid dimensions such as 
quality, lead time or reputation into consideration. Previous experimental studies have focused on 
procurement settings where these dimensions are either exogenously determined or can be condi-
tioned on in contracts. But in many cases private and public procurement settings are characte-
rized by moral hazard regarding non-contractible quality, i.e., the effort exerted or quality sup-
plied cannot be verified by a court. In such a setting reputation could provide bidders with an in-
centive to exert high effort or supply high quality even in the absence of legal enforcement. 
In our study, we test this conjecture and compare price-based and buyer-determined auctions in a 
setting with moral hazard and non-contractible quality. While buyers are bound to buy from the 
lowest bidder in the former mechanism, they can also consider the past performance of bidders in 
the latter. We observe that bidders choose to build up a reputation for supplying high quality in 
buyer-determined auctions, but not in price-based auctions. As a result, the availability of a repu-
tation mechanism increases market efficiency from about 50 percent to about 80 percent.  
While buyers’ profits are increased when implementing reputation information, bidders do not 
benefit from this mechanism. Accordingly, giving subjects the opportunity to choose between the 
price-based auction and the buyer-determined auction, buyers prefer the latter while bidders show 
a tendency to prefer the former mechanism. This might explain why we often, but not exclusive-
ly, observe reputation mechanisms in procurement with moral hazard. Comparing the two kinds 
of reputation information, we find that buyers place a higher weight on an aggregate measure of 
past performances than on the last performance only when choosing between bidders. This sug-19 
gests that buyers rely more on the whole history of a bidder’s behavior than on latest behavior 
only.  
To our knowledge no previous empirical study has analyzed mechanism choices or reputation in 
procurement auctions under controlled conditions. The experiment presented here had to abstract 
from several factors present in the field. Future work should consider auctions with moral hazard 
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Welcome to the experiment!
 
Preface
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in the field of experimental econom-
ics.  During the experiment you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions. By 
doing so, you can earn money. How much you are about to earn depends on your decisions.  Af-
ter the experiment you will receive your earnings in cash.  
The experiment will take about 90 minutes and is split up in two different parts.  Each of these 
parts is introduced by detailed instructions.  
All participants will receive exactly the same instructions.  
Please keep in mind that decisions you made in one of the two parts of the experiment do not 
have any influence on the other part of the experiment.  
None of the participants will receive any information concerning other participants during 
the experiment.  25 
Part 1 
 
Please read the following instructions. Five minutes after you have received the instructions we 
will come to your desk to answer remaining questions. Whenever you should have questions dur-
ing the experiment please simply hold up your hand. We will come to your desk then.  
During the first part of the experiment you will take part in 6 auction rounds.  
Description of the auction rounds
In each of the 6 auction rounds you take part in, a project will be sold. There are exactly two bid-
ders (= potential sellers), you and another bidder.  
Procedure: 
The bidders want to conduct the project. For each auction round and for both bidders we have 
drawn the costs for conducting the project by chance and independently of each other from 100 to 
400 euro cents. All sums of this row could be realized with equal chances. Each bidder will only 
be informed about his own costs for conducting the project. 
At the beginning of each auction round each of the two bidders can decide how much he wants to 
bid for the project. The bid is set to a maximum of 400 euro cents.  
The bidder who puts in the lowest bid wins the auction. His earning is equal to the difference of 
bid and costs for conducting the project. 
The bidder who puts in the highest bid loses the auction. His earning in this case equals zero.  
If both bids are equal the winner will be drawn by chance (meaning each bidder wins the auction 
with a chance of 50 percent).  
Your fellow bidder: 
Your fellow bidder is a computer in each of the 6 auction rounds. The computer is programmed 
to maximize its expected earnings in each auction round (in fact it is bidding in every auction 
round according to the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for risk neutrality). The computer 
expects that you behave like it. The computer expects that your costs for conducting the project 
are drawn out of the range from 100 to 400 euro cents by chance and independently of each other 
and that all values of this range could be realized with equal chance. 
Pay-out
The pay-out of all your earnings of the 6 auction rounds takes place at the end of the whole expe-
riment.   
Please keep in mind that none of the participants will get any information about his earn-
ings per round during the first part of the experiment.  26 
Moreover, none of the participants will get any information about the bidding behavior and 
the earnings of the other participants in part 1 during the whole experiment.  
Screen in Part 1
 
 
Round 1 out of 6            Remaining time (for information):  
       Please  decide  now! 
 
Round 1: 
You are participant number 1 and bidder in all following auctions. 
 
Auction: 
In round 1 your costs to conduct the project add up to 200 euro cents. 
Please put in your bid. 















Please read the following instructions. Ten minutes after you have received the instructions we 
will come to your desk to answer remaining questions. Whenever you should have questions dur-
ing the experiment please simply hold up your hand. We will come to your desk then.  
During the second part of the experiment you will take part in 18 auction rounds. 
 
Description of the auction rounds 
In each of the 18 auction rounds you take part in, a project will be sold. There are exactly two 
bidders (= potential sellers) and one buyer.   
You will be told at the beginning of the first auction round if you decide in the role of a bidder or 
a buyer during the 18 auction rounds. You will stick to your role in each of the 18 auction rounds.  
In each of the 18 rounds the other two participants will be assigned to you by chance so every 
time a buyer and two bidders interact. It is certain that you will not meet the same group of par-
ticipants in two consecutive rounds.  
Procedure: 
The buyer wants to have the project conducted. His valuation for a project (with a quality of 100 
percent, see below) is 400 euro cents in every auction round. The valuation says how valuable the 
project is for the buyer at a 100% quality rate.   
The bidders want to conduct the project. For each auction round and for both bidders we have 
drawn the costs for conducting the project by chance and independently of each other (with a 
quality of 100 percent) from 100 to 400 euro cents. All values of this range could be realized with 
equal chance. Each bidder will only be informed about his own costs for conducting the project. 
The buyer does not get any information concerning the costs.  
Each auction round comprises [PB: two; BD: three; Choice: four] stages: [Choice: In the “auction 
choice phase“ the buyer as well as the bidder can decide upon the type of auction.] In the “auc-
tion phase” both bidders bid for conducting the project. [BD, Choice: In the “buyer choice phase” 
the buyer chooses a winner (= seller) based on the bids and the information he has concerning the 
previous bidder’s choice of quality.] In the “quality choice phase” both bidders decide upon the 
quality of the project in case they should win the auction and receive their bid from the buyer. 
The four stages are described below. 
[Choice: 
Auction Choice Phase: 28 
At the beginning of each round both bidders and the buyer can chose a specific auction type. 
They can choose one of the following auction types: the conduction of the auction round without 
a “bidder choice phase” or with a “bidder choice phase”. By choosing a specific auction type you 
raise the probability of this auction type actually being chosen. You can imagine the auction 
choice as follows: each participant’s decision can be represented by a ball labeled with the chosen 
auction type. Each of the three participants throws his chosen ball in an urn already containing 
two balls – one ball for each auction type. One ball will then be randomly drawn from this urn 
thereby deciding upon the auction type for the current round.  
At the end of the experiment you will see which auction type was actually chosen. This means 
you have to make your decisions for each of the two auction types in case that this type will be 
chosen. The pay-out will be calculated based on the decisions made in the actually chosen auc-
tion type.]  
Auction Phase: 
At the beginning of the auction phase each of the two bidders can decide which bid he wants to 
make for conducting the project. The bid is made for each possible result of the auction choice 
phase meaning for each of the two auction types. The bid is set to a maximum of 400 euro cents.  
[PB: The winnings per round are set as follows; Choice: In case the auction is chosen without a 
“seller choice phase“ the winnings per round are set as follows] 
[PB and Choice: 
The bidder with the lowest bid wins the auction. His winnings per round are set due to his deci-
sion in the quality choice phase (see below). 
The bidder with the highest bid loses the auction. His winnings per round are equal zero. 
If the both bids are equal the winner is drawn by chance (meaning each bidder has a 50% proba-
bility to win the auction).] 
[BD: The winnings per round are set due to the choices made in the “seller choice phase” and the 
“quality choice phase” (see below).; Choice: In case the auction is chosen without a “seller 
choice phase“ the winnings per round are set due to the decisions made in the “seller choice 
phase“ and in the “quality choice phase“ (see below).] 
[BD and Choice: 
Seller Choice Phase: 
In the seller choice phase the buyer decides upon the winner (= seller) in case the auction with a 
seller choice phase is realized. Therefore, he gets the following information about each bidder: 
his bid for this auction type, his quality decision for this auction type in the previous round and 
the average of his quality decisions in all previous rounds of this auction type.] 29 
Quality Choice Phase: 
In the quality choice phase the bidders decide upon the quality of the conducting the project in 
case they win the auction and receive their bid from the buyer. [Choice: The decision upon quali-
ty has to be made for each possible result of the auction choice phase meaning for each of the two 
auction types.] 
The quality rate has to be set between 50% and 100%. Each percent of quality costs the winner of 
the auction (= seller) one percent of his costs for conducting the project drawn for him in the cor-
responding round. Therefore the seller’s costs for conducting the project with 100% quality cor-
respond to his costs and the costs for conducting the project with 50% quality correspond to half 
of his costs.   
Winner’s earnings per round = bid – quality [%]*costs for conducting the project 
The valuation of the project for the buyer decreases with each percent less quality by one percent 
(i.e. by 4 euro cents). Therefore the buyer’s valuation for the project at a quality of 100% is equal 
to 400 euro cents and at a quality of 50% it is equal to 200 euro cents.  
Buyer’s earnings per round = quality [%]*400 – auction’s price  
Pay-out 
After the 18 auction rounds the sum of your winnings per round together with your winnings of 
the first part of the experiment are paid out in cash.  
Before we start with the second part of the experiment in a few moments we ask you to fill 
out a test of understanding on the computer. 30 
Screens for bidders (= potential sellers) in part 2
[Choice:] 





    2 out of 18           Remaining time (for information): 
        Please  decide  now! 
 
 
Round 2:  
 
You are participant No 1 and bidder in all following auctions.  
 
The auction can be carried out with a seller choice phase or without a seller choice phase.  
 
Please mark which auction type you chose:  
 
Auction with seller choice phase  









[PB and Choice:] 




    
    2 out of 18           Remaining time (for information):  
        Please  decide  now!   
 
You are participant No 1 and bidder in all following auctions.  
 
AUCTION [Choice: WITHOUT SELLER CHOICE PHASE]:  
 
In round 2 your costs for conducting the project are 200 euro cents at a rate of 100% quality.  
 
AUCTION PHASE:           QUALITY CHOICE PHASE:  
 
Please bid [Choice: for the case where       Please decide on the quality [Choice: for the 
the auction without a seller choice phase  case  where the auction without a seller choice 
is realized].  phase is realized]. 
 
Your bid is:             Your quality is:  
 
Please keep in mind: If you win an auction your earnings in this round = your bid- quality (%)*200 (euro cents) 
 




[BD and Choice:] 




    2 out of 18           Remaining time (for information):  
        Please  decide  now!   
 
You are participant No 1 and bidder in all following auctions.  
 
AUCTION [Choice: WITH SELLER CHOICE PHASE]: 
 
In round 2 your costs for conducting the project are 200 euro cents at a quality rate of 100%.  
 
AUCTION PHASE:           QUALITY CHOICE PHASE: 
 
Please bid [Choice: for the case where      Please decide on the quality [Choice: for the 
 the auction with a seller choice phase      case where the auction with a seller choice 
is realized].             phase is realized]. 
 
Your bid is:             Your quality is:  
 
  
The seller in this round receives the following information about you:  
 
The bidder’s quality [Choice: for the auction with a seller choice phase] was 100 in the previous round.  
 
The average bidder’s quality in the previous auctions [Choice: with a seller choice phase] was 100.  
 
  Please keep in mind: If you win an auction your earnings in this round = your bid- quality (%)*200 (euro cents).  
 
Confirm price and quality 33 
Screens for buyer in part 2 
 
[Choice] 




    2 out of 18           Remaining time (for information):  
        Please  decide  now!   
 
 
Round 2:  
 
You are participant No 3 and buyer in all following auctions.  
 
The auction can be carried out with a seller choice phase or without a seller choice phase.  
 
Please mark which auction type you chose:  
 
Auction with a seller choice phase  















    1 out of 18           Remaining time (for information):  
        Please  decide  now!   
 
You are participant No 3 and buyer in all following auctions.  
 
 
BIDDER A:  
 
The bidder who has been randomly matched with you as bidder A in this period is the lowest bidder bidding a  




Please keep in mind: your round earnings = quality (%)*400 (euro cents) - bid  
 






[BD and Choice:] 




    2 out of 18           Remaining time (for information):  
        Please  decide  now!   
 
You are participant No 3 and buyer in all following auctions.  
 
SELLER CHOICE PHASE:  
 
BIDDER  A:        BIDDER  B:   
 
Bidder A you are randomly matched with        Bidder B you are randomly matched with  
in this round bids a price of 300 euro         in this round bids a price of 300 euro 
cents.         cents.   
 
The bidder’s quality [Choice: for the      The bidder’s quality [Choice: for the 
auction with seller choice phase] in the        auction with seller choice phase] in the 
previous round was 50.            previous round was 50. 
 
The bidder’s average quality [Choice:     The  bidder’s  average  quality[Choice: 
in the previous auctions with a seller        in the previous auctions with a seller 
choice  phase]  was  50.       choice  phase]  was  50. 
 
Please keep in mind: your round earnings = quality (%)*400 (euro cents) - bid  
 
Please decide between the bidders [Choice: for the case that the auction is realized with a seller choice phase]:  
 
Bidder A 
Bidder B 
OK 
 
 